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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to assess the effects on food security in Georgia following 
a joint direct cash transfer project initiated as an emergency response to the conflict 
with Russia in August 2008. Based on interviews with beneficiaries, it was found that 
their food security situation had improved. Although increased food access and food 
utilisation promoted dietary diversity and food frequency, it was concluded that they 
remain dependent on external assistance. When considering various key determinants 
of transfer choice as well as preferences of both beneficiaries and partners, cash 
assistance was determined to constitute the optimal food assistance instrument when 
addressing the issue of food security in Georgia. While future cash assistance will 
benefit from greater knowledge and experience of partners, further improvements were 
acknowledged to require increased technological capacity, human capital, training and 
monitoring in order to achieve adequate information collection and dissemination. 
 
 
Keywords: cash assistance, food security, Georgia, in-kind food assistance, internally 
displaced persons. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
While food assistance traditionally has taken the form of in-kind food assistance, cash 
assistance has over the years increased in importance when addressing the global issue 
of food security. This development can mainly be derived from improvements in the 
functioning of food markets in developing countries with better-integrated food 
systems, increased urbanisation and broadened access to financial services. Higher 
international food prices have also played a critical role in the increased popularity of 
cash assistance. 
 
The United Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP) has widespread experience 
within the field of food assistance, and Georgia is one of the countries where WFP is 
operating. The organisation initiated in-kind food assistance activities in this southern 
Caucasian country in 1993, and WFP has since 2005 also experience of using cash 
assistance in order to improve the food security situation. 
 
Georgia’s development has been unstable, with fluctuating economic growth following 
its independence in 1991. In addition, today’s global food crisis and its poor relations 
with Russia resulting from the trade embargo in 2006 and the conflict in August 2008, 
have lowered the level of food security in Georgia. 
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1.1 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of a joint direct cash transfer project 
on the food security situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) relocated to 
collective centres following the conflict with Russia in August 2008. 
 
This study aims at answering the following questions: 
• How was the direct cash transfer project designed and implemented? 
• What was the impact of the direct cash transfer project on food security? 
• Is cash assistance the optimal instrument when addressing food security issues 
in Georgia? 
• How can cash assistance be improved? 
 
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
In order to analyse the effects of cash assistance on food security, eight interviews 
arranged as group discussions and individual interviews were held with thirteen 
beneficiary households of the project. Food consumption scores (FCS) were 
furthermore calculated using a seven-day recall method. With the objective to see how 
cash assistance can be improved, project partners were interviewed regarding the 
challenges of and lessons learned from the project. The methodology furthermore 
included the collection and review of reports, research papers and official statistics. 
 
Important to bear in mind is that interviews as methodology may encompass certain 
constraints. As the target group of this study was chosen in order to enable the 
distinction between the effects of other assistance provided, it did not constitute a 
randomly chosen sample and thereby causing selection bias. While beneficiaries may 
provide incorrect information due to their desire to receive additional assistance, the 
outcome of the interviews with project partners may also be biased as the 
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representatives cannot be considered objective in relation to the project. Further 
concerns regarding the reliability of collected information is associated with the 
dependency on a translator. 
 
 
1.3 Limitations 
 
Although there are various instruments of food assistance, cash assistance will be the 
focus of evaluation since the direct cash transfer project exclusively made use of this 
instrument. Furthermore, given that the project was initiated as an emergency response 
to the conflict in August 2008, this study will concentrate on emergency aid. 
 
As the objective of WFP was to increase the dietary diversity and food frequency of 
beneficiaries, the evaluation will be limited to the effects on food security. Although 
there are several measures of food security, this study will use the proxy indicator, 
FCS, as this is the standard measure used by WFP. 
 
A further limitation is that the evaluation of the effects on food security will be 
concentrated to IDPs living in collective centres in Tbilisi and Lagodekhi, disregarding 
those resettled in rural and adjacent areas. 
 
 
1.4 Disposition 
 
This study is structured as follows. The second chapter concerns the theoretical 
foundation of food assistance, and it also describes the concept of food security and 
the key determinants of transfer choice. The third chapter introduces the Georgian 
context, gives an account of the history of food assistance in Georgia and describes in 
detail the direct cash transfer project. The fourth chapter presents the result of the 
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interviews with IDPs and aims at analysing how their food security situation has 
developed as a result of the direct cash transfer project. It furthermore attempts to 
assess whether cash is the optimal choice of food assistance instrument when 
addressing food security issues in Georgia. The fifth chapter comprises challenges and 
lessons learned in relation to the project with the objective of assessing how cash 
assistance projects can be improved in the future. The sixth chapter summarises the 
main findings and draws some policy implications. 
 11 
2 Theoretical Consideration of Food Assistance 
 
 
 
 
 
Consumer theory views households as economic entities maximising utility, driven by 
their preferences and facing budget constraints. While supporters of this theory claim 
that the utility of the recipients will be lower using in-kind food assistance as their 
freedom to choose diminishes, opponents argue that the ability of beneficiaries to 
make rational choices hinges on the information available and accessible. (Gentilini, 
2007, pp. 5-6) 
 
In addition, households in developing countries, where the general level of income is 
low, tend to spend a larger share of their income on food. As their income increases, 
the share spent on food decreases and a proportionally greater part of the additional 
income will therefore be spent on non-food items. This relationship, known as Engel’s 
law of food consumption, implies that a marginal increase of income will have a larger 
effect on food consumption and thus food security, if provided to low-income 
households. 
 
 
2.1 Definition of Food Assistance 
 
“Food assistance refers to the set of instruments used to address the food needs of 
vulnerable people.” (WFP, 2008c, p. 3) 
 
Food assistance is generally divided into instruments and categories. While the 
instruments include in-kind food, vouchers and cash, the categories comprise project, 
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programme and emergency assistance. Although the focus of this study is cash 
transfers in the context of emergency assistance, all instruments and categories will be 
described in order to ensure the comprehension of the reader. 
 
 
2.1.1 Instruments of Food Assistance 
 
In–kind food assistance constitutes food donated to recipient countries free of charge 
or at a price far below international market prices. This type of food assistance 
generally consists of 80 percent cereals and can be delivered directly to beneficiaries 
or sold on the open market, i.e. monetisation. The controversial aspect of this food 
assistance instrument is that the majority of the total assistance is produced in and 
transported from the donor country instead of being purchased on the recipient market 
or in other developing countries. (Belfrage, 2007, p. 163) 
 
Vouchers provide beneficiaries with purchasing power to buy food. A commodity-
based voucher allows beneficiaries to purchase a fixed quantity of food, while a value-
based voucher gives them the possibility of buying food for a specific amount of 
money, usually in selected stores in order to prevent purchases of certain items such as 
alcohol and tobacco. 
 
Cash assistance, as with vouchers, is a form of social assistance that provides 
beneficiaries with purchasing power to buy food or other preferred non-food items. 
The money can be directly distributed to individual households instead of using the 
government or community as intermediary, or provided through different kinds of 
programmes such as cash for work where money is given as an incentive to perform 
work.  
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2.1.2 Categories of Food Assistance 
 
Project food assistance is usually channelled through non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) or governments, who can choose to distribute the assistance directly to 
targeted households or sell it on the open market. Regardless of the method chosen, the 
aim remains the same, i.e. to promote development. (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005, pp. 
13-14) 
 
Programme food assistance is food donated from one government to another, and 
corresponds to a budget increase for the recipient government after monetisation. This 
category of food assistance is not being targeted to particular groups and can be given 
as a grant or loan. In order to acquire programme assistance, recipients need to comply 
with certain conditions determined by the donor, e.g. policy changes to promote 
development. 
 
Emergency assistance is generally channelled multilaterally through NGOs or 
bilaterally via governments. This category of food assistance is targeted to victims of 
natural disasters or conflicts and is at times referred to as humanitarian or relief 
assistance. Its objective is to assist vulnerable people in achieving food security. 
 
 
2.2 Definition of Food Security 
 
“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access 
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs, and food preferences 
for an active and healthy life.” (World Food Summit, 1996) 
 
As a means to evaluate food security, the three indicators food availability, food access 
and food utilisation should be taken into consideration. (WFP, 2009, pp. 22-23) 
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2.2.1 Indicators of Food Security 
 
Food availability refers to the amount of food that physically exists through local 
production, commercial imports, stocks of food in trader and government reserves, as 
well as in-kind food assistance. 
 
Food access measures the capacity of a household to acquire food through its own 
production of crops or livestock, market and shop purchases, exchange of non-food to 
food items, gifts from family and friends as well as transfers from government and aid 
organisations. If households cannot require enough food from these mechanisms, food 
may be available but not accessible.  
 
Food utilisation concerns the use of food accessible to households and the ability of 
individuals to benefit from nutrients in the food. Even if food is available and 
accessible, some people might not profit entirely if the amount or variety of food is 
inadequate, or if they cannot absorb the nutrients due to illness or poor preparation 
methods. 
 
Having enough food in aggregate does not therefore guarantee that people reach a 
sufficient level of food or nutritional intake i.e. achieve food security. 
 
 
2.2.2 Food Consumption Score 
 
As it is difficult to capture food security in terms of food availability, food access and 
food utilisation in one measure due to the complexity and multidimensionality of these 
indicators, the proxy indicator FCS can be used. It measures the level of food security 
by taking into account dietary diversity, food frequency and relative nutritional 
importance of different food groups. When analysing the validity of the FCS, 
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Wiesmann et al. (2009, p. 46) found that it is a useful measure as dietary diversity and 
food frequency are highly correlated with calorie consumption per capita. 
 
Table 2.1: Calculating Food Consumption Score 
Food item Food group Weight Days consumed Score 
Bread, cereals, potatoes, pasta Cereals and tubers 2   
Beans, peas, nuts Pulses 3   
Vegetables, herbs Vegetables 1   
Fruits, berries Fruits 1   
Meat, fish, eggs Meat 4   
Cheese, milk, yoghurt Dairy products 4   
Sugar and sweets Sugar 0.5   
Oil and fats Oil 0.5   
Source: WFP, 2008b, p. 8. 
 
The FCS is calculated by using a seven-day recall method, implying that the number 
of days a certain food item is consumed by a household during the last seven days will 
be recorded (Table 2.1). If a certain food item is eaten on three of the last seven days it 
should be given a frequency score of three, even if it has been eaten more than once a 
day. The food items are then assembled into the appropriate food group, for which the 
maximum number of consumption days is seven. Thus, if one food item is eaten on 
four of the last seven days and another food item within the same food group is eaten 
every day, the food group will be given a frequency score of seven. There is however 
an inherent risk of bias in the FCS measurement (Wiesmann et al., 2009, p. 9). If 
consumption of e.g. potatoes and maize is recorded separately, starch-rich products 
will be counted double in cases where these food items are eaten together and thus 
distort the FCS upwards. By limiting the number of food groups to eight and the food 
frequency of each food group to seven, this bias can to some extent be controlled for. 
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FCS = αcereals and tubers βcereals and tubers + αpulses βpulses + αvegetables βvegetables + αfruits βfruits + 
αmeat βmeat + αdairy products βdairy products + αsugar βsugar + αoil βoil 
 
αi = weight of food group 
βi = number of days consumed 
 
By multiplying the weight of the respective food group with the consumption 
frequencies per food group, the weighted food group score is obtained. Summing up 
the weighted food group scores then gives the compound FCS. (WFP, 2008a, p. 10) 
 
The weights assigned to different food groups depend on their relative nutrient density 
i.e. their caloric value and content of various nutrients as well as the amount generally 
eaten (WFP, 2008b, p. 19). Although they are subjectively chosen, the rationale 
derives from the idea that foods relatively rich in energy and high quality protein or 
different nutrients are given greater importance and will therefore receive a higher 
weight. Applying weights to FCS is however found to slightly reduce the correlation 
coefficient by calorie consumption per capita (Wiesmann et al., 2009, p. 53). Although 
it may therefore not achieve its purpose of reflecting the quantity consumed, FCS is 
valuable in order to indicate nutritional quality. 
 
Table 2.2: Thresholds of Food Consumption Score 
FCS Adjusted FCS Food consumption profile 
< 21 < 28 Poor food consumption 
21 to 35 28 to 42 Borderline food consumption 
> 35 > 42 Acceptable food consumption 
Source: WFP, 2008b, p. 9. 
 
The calculated FCS is furthermore to be compared with pre-established thresholds 
indicating the profile of food consumption for the household (Table 2.2). While 
households characterised by poor food consumption represent those with a FCS 
smaller than 21, borderline food consumption corresponds to scores between 21 and 
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35. Acceptable food consumption is assigned to households recording scores above 35. 
Depending on the context, these thresholds may have to be adjusted to correct for 
specific dietary patterns. When considering a population with a daily consumption of 
sugar, oil and bread, a FCS of 21 is easily reached. Since this uniform diet cannot be 
said to qualify as borderline food consumption, seven points could be added to the 
thresholds in order to compensate for the bias resulting from the daily intake of sugar 
and oil.  
 
Important to consider is further that the thresholds used by WFP correspond to a very 
low calorie intake where the group of households that falls under the category of poor 
food consumption in fact corresponds to extreme undernourishment (Wiesmann et al., 
2009, p. 47). The level of food security may thus be overestimated. Omitting food 
items only consumed in small quantities can partly control for this exclusion error, 
which in turn also increases the correlation between FCS and calorie consumption per 
capita. This correlation however weakens in cases where in-kind food assistance is 
provided, i.e. those benefiting from in-kind food assistance have higher calorie 
consumption and lower dietary diversity than beneficiaries receiving cash assistance.  
 
 
2.3 Key Determinants of Transfer Choice 
 
The selection of food assistance instrument needs to be preceded by a proper analysis 
of the context in which the project will be implemented. This section will therefore 
assess relevant aspects of cash versus in-kind food assistance, as these are the 
instruments used by WFP in Georgia. 
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2.3.1 Cash Assistance versus In-kind Food Assistance 
 
Project Objectives 
A pre-condition for achieving effectiveness and efficiency within a project is that the 
objective and the target group must be properly defined at an early stage. While cash 
assistance with the purpose of increasing purchasing power will be effective at all 
times, the comparison between the effects on food security of cash and in-kind food 
assistance is only worth exploring if the purpose is to impact on food consumption and 
nutrition. Whereas effectiveness means fulfilling project objectives, efficiency requires 
project costs to be related to its objectives. A cheap project is therefore not always an 
efficient one as it can fail to achieve the project objectives. (Gentilini, 2007, p. 8) 
 
Project Costs 
The provision of cash is more cost-efficient than distributing food since the costs of 
purchasing, storing and re-distributing food do not arise in the context of cash 
assistance. The costs for beneficiaries are also reduced since they do not have to 
collect the food items personally at a distribution site. If the project is prepared 
properly, which is not always possible in an emergency situation, expenses could be 
further decreased. In this context it is worth noting that cash assistance has the 
advantage of rapid implementation. Furthermore, the small cost of providing cash as 
opposed to in-kind food assistance can generate positive effects by allocating 
additional resources to monitoring and accounting (Gentilini, 2007, p. 13). Important 
to bear in mind however is that the complexity and sensitivity of cash require more 
monitoring, at the same time as the ability to monitor is related to the scale of the 
project. Despite the cost-efficiency of cash assistance, there are specific costs related 
to this food assistance instrument and these concern security and financial services as 
well as transportation costs for local shop owners resulting from the increased demand. 
(Harvey, 2005, pp. 11-13) 
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Market Conditions 
As food markets are the main instrument for ensuring food security, it is of utmost 
importance to design cash and in-kind food assistance projects that do not distort food 
market prices and incentives. One often mentioned disadvantage of cash assistance is 
nevertheless its impact on inflation when the market supply of food is not able to 
respond to the rising demand. This risk of supply-failure tends to be higher in 
developing countries where markets are often poorly functioning and less integrated 
(Kebede, 2006, p. 587). This view is confirmed by Sen (1982, p. 456) who argues that 
markets in developing countries only respond by raising the supply when the 
purchasing power of the population has improved. The negative aspect of inflation is 
challenged as price increases in markets with inelastic supply induce more food to be 
allocated to poor households since the provision of cash assistance provides them with 
greater purchasing power, while that of non-beneficiary households decreases (Drèze 
and Sen, 1989, p. 88). This favouring of in-kind food assistance can be further 
strengthened if prices are higher locally than internationally, restraining the food 
access of beneficiaries and thereby making it more valuable for them to receive food 
than cash. Distributing cash may nevertheless have positive secondary effects on the 
local economy. Cash is more likely to stimulate local production as it enables 
purchases of agricultural inputs at the same time as small shop owners and 
entrepreneurs benefit from increased local demand. Davies and Davey (2008, pp. 108-
109) illustrate these effects when assessing the impact of an emergency cash transfer 
pilot project in rural Malawi. Important to bear in mind however is that the main focus 
of traders is to achieve higher profit rather than humanitarian objectives, making it 
risky to solely rely on markets in emergency situations.  
 
Administrative Capacity 
The implementation of cash assistance requires a certain level of administrative 
capacity, such as national financial systems, in order to limit corruption and to ensure 
the safety of both beneficiaries and implementing staff. While a personal bank account 
implies that beneficiaries do not have to keep their cash at home and that the staff does 
not need to deliver the cash manually, it also familiarises beneficiaries with the formal 
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bank system and provides them with the opportunity to withdraw money whenever 
convenient. Additional advantages of using the financial system are the promotion of 
savings as well as the insurance of documentation and proof of payment. By increasing 
transparency through dissemination of information regarding the project and by 
signing cheques and applying fingerprinting, the often-mentioned risk of corruption 
can further be reduced. This view is strengthened by the reasoning of Reinikka and 
Svensson (2006, p. 1) who found a strong negative relationship between the access to 
sources of information and the level of corruption when analysing a newspaper 
campaign in Uganda. Still, there are also inconveniences related to the financial 
system since banks require a certain amount of time for transactions and their 
flexibility regarding timing of the distribution is limited. (Gentilini, 2007, pp. 13-15) 
 
Social Protection 
When combined with social protection strategies, cash assistance tends to be more 
effective as the integration increases the guarantee and predictability of transfers as 
well as facilitates the adjustment of the project to the specific context. This 
combination can further promote the phasing-out of relief projects and hence assist the 
recipient country in taking over the responsibility of the food assistance interventions. 
(Gentilini, 2007, pp. 17-18) 
 
Beneficiary Preferences 
Beneficiary preferences regarding the food assistance instrument depend on location, 
gender and season. While in-kind food assistance tends to be favoured by those living 
in distant areas, people living near markets generally prefer cash transfers. Women are 
furthermore likely to favour in-kind food assistance in cultures where men are 
responsible for managing the household cash since it is harder for them to keep control 
of cash than food. Whereas cash is often preferred before and during harvest, in-kind 
food assistance tends to be favoured during lean seasons when food prices generally 
are higher and grain stocks have been consumed or sold. Cash and in-kind food 
assistance can thus be considered as complements rather than substitutes, and a 
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combination of the two may therefore be particularly beneficial in terms of food 
security when targeting rural populations. (Gentilini, 2007, p. 16) 
 
Beneficiary preferences also depend on the flexibility of the food assistance instrument 
where cash empowers beneficiaries by providing greater freedom to prioritise 
according to their specific needs. This in turn may result in improved dietary diversity 
of beneficiaries, as well as greater dignity since they do not have to queue in order to 
receive food. Provided that reselling is not possible, Faminow (1995, p. 7) confirms 
this view as he argues that recipients of in-kind food assistance may perceive their 
utility as being lower, since they must consume on a different consumption bundle 
than would be the case if they had received cash assistance of the equivalent amount. 
The flexibility aspect of cash may however put nutritional objectives at risk since 
beneficiaries may choose to spend the cash assistance on items not corresponding to 
the purpose of the project. Hence, it makes cash less efficient in targeting specific 
needs compared to in-kind food assistance. The targeting is further complicated by the 
attractiveness of cash, since all levels in society may want to benefit from the 
assistance. It is important to note however the evidence of successful targeting where 
cash targeted to women contributed to increased food expenditures and reduced 
expenses of tobacco and alcohol (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995, p. 2; Schady and 
Rosero, 2008, p. 248). A final factor in favour of cash assistance is that preferences of 
beneficiaries are generally not taken into account when delivering in-kind food 
assistance. As often criticised, it is rather the donor country that practices its strategy 
of preparing for future exports by deciding on which food items to provide. 
 
 
2.3.2 Decision Trees 
 
In order to facilitate the selection of which food assistance instrument to implement in 
order to address the issue of food security, policy makers and aid organisations can 
make use of decision trees. Although this tool can be designed in various ways and 
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take different aspects into account, the context in which food assistance is to be 
implemented plays a determining role in the transfer choice at all times. 
 
Figure 2.1: Barrett-Maxwell Decision Tree 
Are local markets functioning well? 
Yes Provide cash assistance or jobs to targeted 
 recipients rather than in-kind food assistance. 
No 
 
Is there sufficient food available nearby to fill the gap? 
Yes Provide in-kind food assistance based on 
 local purchases or triangular transactions. 
No Provide in-kind food assistance based on 
 intercontinental shipments. 
Source: Gentilini, 2007, p. 10. 
 
In the Barrett-Maxwell decision tree (Figure 2.1) the decision of which food assistance 
instrument to implement hinges on the functioning of local markets and the level of 
food availability. In countries where markets are well functioning, the decision maker 
is advised to provide cash assistance or employment to beneficiaries. If the situation is 
the opposite, in-kind food assistance is regarded a more suitable option.  
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Figure 2.2: Oxfam Decision Tree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gentilini, 2007, p. 11. 
 
A second and more intricate decision tree is the Oxfam decision tree (Figure 2.2), 
developed by Creti and Jaspars (2006, p. 22). Although a number of questions need to 
be answered in order to determine the optimal instrument of food assistance, they all 
relate to the focal question of whether the market is able to respond to the increase in 
demand resulting from the provision of cash assistance. 
Cause of food or 
income insecurity 
Is the market 
operating? 
Is the government 
restricting food 
movement? 
Is the market 
competitive? 
Is the market 
integrated? 
Will traders respond 
to the demand? 
Is there a risk of inflation 
in the price of key 
commodities? 
Supply failure Demand failure 
Is food available in 
neighbouring markets? 
Result of income loss? 
Food availability is a 
problem. Consider in-
kind food assistance. 
Demand failure is the result of high 
prices. Consider in-kind food 
assistance but also market support, 
such as improving infrastructure and 
helping value-chain actors to 
recover. 
Cash intervention may 
result in price increases. 
Consider in-kind food 
assistance. Lobby 
governments to change 
policy. 
Prices controlled by traders. 
Consider in-kind food assistance but 
also measures to reduce speculation, 
e.g. setting prices by means of 
contracts with traders. 
Without market integration, supply 
will not meet demand. Improve 
market integration, e.g. supply 
transport. 
If traders do not respond, food prices 
may increase. Consider in-kind food 
assistance. 
Implement cash assistance, targeting 
women if possible. 
Consider whether 
continuing adjustment of 
sums disbursed is viable. If 
not, implement in-kind 
food assistance. 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
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3 Cash Assistance in Georgia 
 
 
 
 
 
The choice of food assistance instrument depends on the conditions in which the 
project is to be implemented, thus the Georgian context will be introduced. The history 
of food assistance in Georgia and a comprehensive description of the direct cash 
transfer project will then be provided. 
 
 
3.1 Georgian Context 
 
Georgia obtained independence when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991. Its history 
has since then been dominated by weak economic performance resulting from low 
levels of education and investments in combination with poor governance as well as 
high levels of inflation and corruption. Internal conflicts following independence also 
proved detrimental to the economy and generated a great number of IDPs. The 
economic situation did not improve until 2006 when gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth reached positive double-digit numbers, induced by the Rose Revolution in 
2003 where government change was accompanied by political, institutional and 
economic reforms. In line with these changes, corruption decreased significantly to a 
level where it only exists at the very top of the government (Transparency 
International, 2003-2008). While improvements in public health and education have 
been the main contributors to Georgia’s present ranking in the United Nations (UN) 
medium human development index (UNDP, 2008, p. 30), the country is still 
characterised by relatively high gender inequality as the UN ranks it among countries 
of low gender empowerment (UNDP, 2006).  
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However, a number of events are currently challenging the economic progress 
achieved so far. One of them is the trade embargo imposed by Russia in 2006 with a 
ban on imports from Georgia and a tax of 40 percent on wheat and flour exports to 
Georgia (Robinson, 2008, p. 26). Even though evidence shows that Russia’s influence 
on economic growth in Georgia has declined since 1991, changes in the Russian trade 
policy still constitute key factors of food security in Georgia. An additional challenge 
is the current global food crisis that has caused food prices in Georgia to increase by 
12 percent during 2008. The price of wheat flour rose by more than 30 percent during 
the same period. (Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia, 2009, p. 17) 
Furthermore, the conflict in August 2008 between the central Georgian government 
and Russia, together with the secessionist territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, is 
threatening the food security situation in Georgia as the total number of IDPs has 
increased to approximately 220,000 among the population of 4,600,000 individuals 
(CIA, 2009).  
 
The favourable Georgian conditions, when it comes to addressing the issue of food 
security with cash assistance, should nonetheless be noted. The markets are well 
functioning, particularly those in urban areas, which are characterised by a great 
number of traders, a diversified supply as well as stable prices. Even the rural 
population can contribute its produce and benefit from imported products as it has 
well-developed connections with these markets. Since there are no major bottlenecks, 
the markets are expected to have the ability to increase supply when demand increases. 
 
In line with the overall economic development in Georgia, the activity in the banking 
sector has increased significantly. One of the largest contributors in this regard is the 
People’s Bank of Georgia (PBG) which has wide presence in Georgia with a large 
number of banks as well as ATMs accepting credit cards from all groups in society in 
order to reduce corruption and to increase the safety of transactions. 
 
One additional factor further contributing to the observed decrease in the level of 
corruption is the Georgian government, as it makes use of the progress made in the 
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banking sector. By hiring PBG and by using its services when delivering pensions and 
allowances to the population, the risk of corruption is reduced. This innovative 
approach in combination with an increased government budget for social security 
makes the Georgian social protection system one additional factor that militates in 
favour of cash assistance when addressing food security needs in Georgia. 
 
 
3.2 History of Food Assistance  
 
WFP initiated its activities in Georgia in 1993, two years after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, with the objective of improving the overall food security situation as 
well as to assist the country in its transition towards a democratic and market-based 
economy.  
 
While emergency operations (EMOPs)2 constituted the main way of delivering food 
assistance until 1999, the majority of the assistance has since then been provided 
through protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs)3. Additionally, in-kind 
food assistance constituted the food assistance instrument exclusively used by WFP in 
Georgia prior to 2005 when cash assistance was introduced as an alternative way of 
addressing food security issues. As it had been determined that the food security 
situation in Georgia varied by region and season, and furthermore confirmed that the 
country conditions were favourable for implementing cash assistance, a combined 
food and cash for work project was initiated. This first project was implemented 
between December 2005 and March 2006, targeting 4,600 beneficiaries and aiming at 
determining whether Georgia had the procedural, administrative and institutional 
requirements for achieving a proper implementation of cash assistance. (WFP, 2007, p. 
2) A second project was initiated by WFP in August 2007 targeting 7,000 beneficiaries 
                                            
2 In general implemented during three to twelve months. 
3 Provided if further assistance is required after the expiration of an EMOP.  
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during five months by providing cash as remuneration for work (WFP forthcoming, p. 
11). This cash for work project was implemented with the intention to better assess the 
effects of cash assistance and to determine the value of this instrument as an 
alternative food assistance instrument of the organisation. Since the last and most 
recently implemented cash assistance project in Georgia was initiated as an emergency 
response to the conflict in August 2008, there was an urgent need of rapid 
implementation and it was therefore decided to execute a direct cash transfer project. 
 
Figure 3.1: WFP In-kind Food Assistance in Georgia 
 
Source: WFP, 1998-2008. 
 
In parallel with the development of cash assistance, traditional in-kind food projects 
have continuously been provided. While peaking in 2001 with almost 600,000 
individuals due to the severe drought in the country, the total number of beneficiaries 
mainly fluctuated between 100,000 and 300,000 from 1998 to 2008 (Figure 3.1). 
Despite these variations, the number reduced from approximately 300,000 to 250,000 
during the same period. Of the total number of beneficiaries, the conflict-affected 
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population predominantly remained at fewer than 8,000 individuals after 1998, before 
it exceeded 120,000 in 2008 following the conflict in August that year. 
 
 
3.3 Direct Cash Transfer Project 
 
The direct cash transfer project, which was the first of its kind ever implemented by 
WFP, was carried out between February and April 2009 as an emergency response to 
the conflict with Russia in August 2008. It aimed at assisting those 29,000 IDPs who 
could not return to their homes and who now live in collective centres, settlements and 
private households around Georgia. 
 
 
3.3.1 Design 
 
Besides being the first direct cash transfer project ever implemented by WFP, it was 
also the first one jointly implemented by three UN agencies in a post-conflict 
emergency situation in Georgia. WFP took the role as the leading agency, cooperating 
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United 
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). The project was 
executed in collaboration with the Georgian Ministry of Refugees and 
Accommodation (MRA), the Civil Registry Agency of Georgia (CRA) and PBG. It 
was furthermore financially supported by the European Commission Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
to cover the total cost of approximately 2 million United States Dollars (USD) of 
which 1.8 million constituted the cash distributed to beneficiaries. 
 
In order to evaluate the food security situation of IDPs, an emergency food security 
assessment (EFSA) was executed by WFP in September 2008. While it was found that 
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the average consumption level of IDPs living in collective centres in Tbilisi was 
classified as borderline consumption, the dietary diversity was confirmed poor. 
Although the general food distributions (GFDs) and the bakery scheme, provided by 
WFP since the outbreak of the conflict, gave a minimum of 2,100 kcal required for the 
climate conditions in Georgia, the winter was approaching and an additional intake of 
300 kcal was necessary. According to Khatuna Epremidze at WFP, additional in-kind 
food assistance was not an option since costs for procurement distribution of 
complementary food were not justified in Georgia where markets are functioning and 
the level of food availability is adequate. The idea of using vouchers limited to certain 
supermarkets was thus discussed since the majority of IDPs were initially located in 
Tbilisi. However, as the IDPs moved into areas where the number of supermarkets was 
limited, the suggestion of vouchers was rejected in favour of cash. The risk of cash 
assistance giving rise to inflation did not constitute an obstacle to implementation as 
WFP did not consider it a threat due to the small target group, the short 
implementation period, the diversity of the market as well as the absence of previous 
experience in prices rising as a result of cash assistance. 
 
While the overall objective of the project was to address basic household requirements 
through the provision of cash, WFP specifically aimed at increasing food security of 
IDPs by complementing their GFDs of dry staple foods with fresh foods. A sum of 75 
Georgian Lari (GEL), corresponding to the gap of 300 kcal, was therefore distributed 
to IDPs above the age of 2 over the three months of implementation. While the 
Georgian government assisted with a one-time transfer of GEL 100 to schoolchildren 
between the age of 6 and 16 for the purchase of winter clothing, UNICEF and UNHCR 
provided the same amount to children below the age of 6 and persons above the age of 
16 respectively, in order to cover the gap. In addition, UNICEF gave a monthly 
payment of GEL 100 to children below the age of 2 with the purpose of buying 
complementary food and hygienic items. Since housing as well as gas and electricity 
for cooking were provided free of charge by the government, these did not constitute a 
need that had to be covered by the cash assistance. 
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In order to select the beneficiaries of the project, WFP worked closely together with 
the Georgian government. CRA, which is responsible for civil registering of the 
Georgian population, was given the task of registering the people displaced as a result 
of the conflict since MRA, which generally has this responsibility, did not have the 
capacity required. MRA instead assigned itself solely to its second regular task, i.e. to 
keep track of the movements of IDPs. Notable in this context is that when IDPs got 
registered, they received IDP status which entitled them to the monthly IDP assistance 
of GEL 28 provided by the government. 
 
 
3.3.2 Implementation 
 
The first setback of the project was that its implementation was postponed from 
January to February 2009. As the direct cash transfer project was the first of its kind 
implemented, the regular process of releasing funds within WFP was more time-
consuming than expected and the project approval of WFP headquarters was therefore 
delayed. Another reason for the postponement was the large number of IDPs and their 
frequent movements, preventing MRA from keeping track of them and hence properly 
constructing the list of IDPs. The lack of information about the IDPs who lived with 
family or friends in the private sector further complicated the work of MRA. Although 
the implementation of the project was postponed, the preparations made by WFP were 
all completed within two months. The ability to implement cash assistance rapidly, 
which is especially important in emergency situations, was hence confirmed. In 
addition, Epremidze was of the opinion that the project was not more costly than if 
more comprehensive preparations had been possible.  
 
The cash assistance was distributed to 11,404 beneficiary households by the use of the 
national banking system, where WFP chose to continue its collaboration with PBG due 
to its wide presence around Georgia and its experience of being responsible for the 
government social assistance schemes. The task of the bank, for which WFP paid a 
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commission of 1.5 percent, was to open bank accounts according to the list of IDPs 
and to distribute the bankcards to the branch office situated closest to each beneficiary.  
 
Although Georgia is characterised by low gender empowerment, the risk of the man 
seizing the cash from the woman was seen as limited according to Giorgi Dolidze at 
WFP. The bankcards were therefore issued to a woman of each household, where 
applicable, in order to ensure female managing of the cash. Dolidze furthermore stated 
that this targeting strategy turned out to be successful, as 85 percent of the cardholders 
were women. Although households were given the opportunity to apply for one 
additional bankcard free of charge, only 1 percent of the households made use of this 
possibility according to Keti Nadiradze at PBG.  
 
In order to notify beneficiaries about the intended use of the cash assistance and the 
date of each transaction, television, radio and newspapers were employed to transmit 
the information. Furthermore, 500 posters and 25,000 leaflets with descriptions of the 
project and propositions on how to spend the money were printed and disseminated 
among beneficiaries in order to ensure full transparency. Despite the promotional 
efforts, it was observed that the beneficiaries were not adequately informed about the 
project and its purpose. An explanation may be the limited access to sources of 
information for beneficiaries, as a result of their constrained income. It could also be 
culturally obtained, according to Epremidze, as people in Georgia were said to not 
trust written information, but rather had their neighbour inform them. This is also a 
possible explanation as to why so few additional cards were issued, although it was 
free of charge and connected with a number of benefits. 
 
While the majority of the transactions could be executed as planned, initial registration 
mistakes such as exclusion and inclusion errors or misspelled personal information 
caused beneficiaries to be added late to the list of IDPs. Hence, some beneficiaries 
received the total amount of cash retroactively in a one-time transfer. 
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With the aim of solving the problems related to the list of IDPs, additional efforts were 
required by the project partners. The list was continuously updated and a special 
hotline was opened within MRA with the responsibility of assisting in the on-going 
registration as well as answering questions about the project. An inconvenience 
however was that the calls were not free of charge. In order to verify and crosscheck 
the information received through the hotline, MRA also set up a verification 
committee. Monitors were furthermore sent by MRA and WFP to collective centres 
and settlements with the purpose of ensuring that the information in the list of IDPs 
corresponded to the reality. The monitors, as well as the hotline staff, were offered 
training and capacity building by WFP, which also conducted post-distribution 
monitoring after each transfer in order to ensure proper implementation. 
 
Despite the efforts made and although WFP and UNICEF further increased the 
capacity of the hotline through the provision of additional laptops and telephones, 
postponements of transactions remained throughout the implementation. As stated by 
Dolidze, the last transaction made in the end of June was performed on the request of 
MRA which had identified an additional number of 421 IDPs eligible for receiving the 
cash assistance. As the project was already finalised, this constituted an exceptional 
payment, which was therefore only accepted by WFP and UNICEF, while disregarded 
by UNHCR. 
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4 Food Security in Georgia 
 
 
 
 
 
The provision of cash to beneficiaries from donor organisations is expected to have a 
positive impact on dietary diversity and food frequency through increased access to 
food, thus stimulating improvements of food security. 
 
 
4.1 Food Security Prior to the Project 
 
In order to assess the food security situation of the IDPs, needs assessments were 
performed by WFP in September 2008 and jointly by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), UNICEF and WFP in February 2009.  
 
Although the level of food availability on the Georgian markets was confirmed 
sufficient both in September and February (WFP, 2008a, p. 30; FAO/UNICEF/WFP, 
2009, p. 29), the food access of IDPs living in Tbilisi was limited due to their 
constrained income and inadequate level of cooking facilities (WFP, 2008a, p. 30). 
Their poor access to food could furthermore be derived from the limited urban job 
market, as the survey in September showed 57 percent of the IDPs having no income 
source (WFP, 2008a, p. 14). 
 
Despite the restricted access to food, the assessment of September showed that FCS 
for IDPs living in collective centres in Tbilisi averaged 28. This score indicated 
borderline food consumption and consequently no risk of undernourishment for the 
IDPs. As this result was mainly due to the in-kind food assistance provided by WFP, a 
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main cause for concern was however their poor dietary diversity which could lead to 
long-term health complications. Yet another reason for concern regarding their food 
utilisation was that only 13 percent of the IDPs had adequate supplies of personal 
hygienic items such as soap and sanitary cloth. (WFP, 2008a, p. 14) 
 
The poor dietary diversity of the IDPs was reconfirmed in February 2009 when it also 
was observed that 18 percent of the households had poor food consumption, 67 percent 
classified as borderline, and only 15 percent recorded an acceptable level of food 
consumption. Among the households in the survey of September 2008, not a single 
one was consuming meat more than twice a week, compared to 5 percent of the 
households in the assessment in February. The percentage of households consuming 
vegetables more than twice a week had increased from 6 to 26, and the share of 
households consuming dairy products more than twice a week had increased from 2 to 
11 percent. Fruits were furthermore consumed more than twice a week by 3 percent of 
the households in September, compared with 19 percent in the later survey. The 
above-described improvements in dietary diversity can partly be explained by more 
people receiving the monthly governmental IDP assistance and by the lower 
unemployment level among IDPs in February. Despite this advance, dietary diversity 
was limited as it was noted that 56 percent of the households in the February survey 
did not eat meat at all. Moreover, 56 percent consumed vegetables less than twice a 
week, while fruits and dairy products were only consumed more than twice a week by 
30 percent of the households. (FAO/UNICEF/WFP, 2009, pp. 28-30) 
 
 
4.2 Effects of the Project on Food Security 
 
We conducted four group discussions and four individual interviews between 2 and 7 
July 2009 with beneficiaries chosen among the 421 IDPs receiving the exceptional 
payment and living in collective centres in the capital Tbilisi and the smaller village 
Lagodekhi. In order to allow for separation from the effect of assistance provided by 
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UNICEF, the interviewed households were selected from 167 IDP households 
comprising 353 individuals without children below the age of 6. Based on an average 
for the thirteen households interviewed, we will analyse the two different types of 
interviews jointly. 
 
 
4.2.1 Expenditures and Sources 
 
The households, with an average size of two individuals, had lately been added to the 
list of IDPs and hence received the exceptional payment averaged GEL 138 as a one-
time payment. 69 percent of these households had no other income source than the 
received cash assistance, indicating an increase since September 2008. The probability 
of beneficiaries lying about additional income sources, in order to increase possibilities 
of further transfers, was considered low according to Tamara Nanitashvili at WFP. The 
reasoning concerning the attractiveness of cash can thus be disregarded. 
 
Figure 4.1: Cash Assistance Expenditures 
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We found that the households had spent the total amount of the cash received within a 
week after the transaction, of which they had used 55 percent to purchase food items 
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(Figure 4.1). This large fraction indicates that the need for food among the 
beneficiaries, despite GFDs and the bakery scheme, was significant and the project can 
thus be said to have been timely implemented. At the same time, 45 percent of the 
amount received had not been devoted to the intended purpose. While this had a 
negative impact on the access to food of IDPs, it also indicates that they had other 
pressing needs than solely food or simply that these households were not in need of the 
cash assistance. An additional explanation is the one-time transfer that may have 
enabled IDPs to purchase non-food items even when their food needs were met. Health 
expenses constituted 20 percent of the cash assistance expenditures, resulting from 
eight households spending between 20 and 50 percent of the cash assistance (Table 
A.1 in Annex A). This high share spent on health by some of the households may 
indicate deficiencies in the current governmental provision of medical care for IDPs, 
where purchases of medicines need to be covered by the IDPs themselves while 
medical referral is free of charge. The 12 percent of the expenditures on clothing 
resulting from four households spending between 35 and 50 percent can be explained 
by the emergency situation, which forced the IDPs to leave their homes without their 
assets. Repayment of loans was furthermore exclusively observed in Lagodekhi, where 
the two households spent as much as 60 percent on this post, thus constituting a 9 
percent share of the cash assistance expenditures of the total number of households. 
This phenomenon can partly be explained by late inclusion in the list of IDPs and by 
difficulties in finding employment in a smaller village. Four households spent 5 to 10 
percent on transportation, hence leading to a share of 2 percent for the total number of 
households. This small percentage may be the result of the government providing 
people with IDP status free transportation by bus within the city of Tbilisi, implying 
that the cash assistance did not have to cover expenses of this type. Furthermore, the 
post named other items constituted 1 percent of the cash assistance expenditures, 
representing one household’s purchases of tobacco for 10 percent of the cash received. 
We finally observed that the cash assistance was never used for purchases of 
household or hygienic items. The absence of expenditures on these items may have 
constrained the positive effects on food security of IDPs as their food utilisation could 
not benefit from improved health status or preparation methods. 
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In addition to the assessment of how the cash assistance was spent by beneficiary 
households, we evaluated the expenditures originating from all income sources. It was 
found that the majority of the households had increased their expenditures on meat, 
vegetables and fruit, health care and hygienic items after receiving the cash assistance. 
Although the cash was not used directly to purchase hygienic items, the increased 
expenditures on hygienic items indicate that the cash assistance freed resources that 
enabled households to prioritise purchases of these items. Nevertheless, the 
expenditures on bread, wheat flour, sugar and sweets, oils and fats remained 
unchanged, which is explained by the inclusion of these food items in the GFDs and 
bakery scheme provided by WFP. Other cereals, household items, transportation and 
clothing were additional categories of unchanged expenditures. Since the two latter 
also were items of cash assistance expenditures, this indicates that households could 
spend additional income sources on other items than clothing and transportation. As 
the majority of the cash assistance was spent on food and health items, it can be 
assumed that the freed resources were spent on these items and thus positively 
influenced food security. 
 
Figure 4.2: Food Expenditure Sources 
0.0 %0.0 %0.0 %
0.8 %
1.9 %
11.9 %
37.7 %
47.7 %
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
UN cash
assistance
In-kind food
assistance
Other cash
resources
Gift Barter Borrowed Bought on
credit
Own
production
 
 38 
When turning to the evaluation of various sources enabling the households to purchase 
food, we found that the food expenditures of IDPs mainly originated from the cash 
provided through the direct cash transfer project (Figure 4.2). Approximately half of 
the food bought was paid for with the cash assistance, while in-kind food assistance 
provided by WFP constituted the second largest food expenditure source. Together 
they amounted to nearly 90 percent of the total food expenditures, suggesting that 
IDPs heavily depend on outside assistance when meeting their food requirements. The 
remaining expenditure sources included other cash resources such as governmental 
social programmes and remuneration for work as well as gifts and barters. 
 
As the project purpose was to complement the GFDs with fresh foods in order to 
improve dietary diversity, the above-described expenditure pattern indicates that the 
objective has been met. However, the dependence on cash and in-kind food assistance 
remains notable. In line with theory, the increased expenditures on food and limited 
purchases of tobacco and alcohol may have been stimulated by the achieved aim of 
targeting women. A large fraction devoted to health care as well as increased 
expenditures on hygienic items may have further reinforced the positive effects on 
food security of IDPs through improved health status and food safety, which implies 
ameliorated food utilisation. Although cash assistance spent on health and hygiene can 
be said to have an indirect positive effect on food security, the direct effect occurring 
when the assistance is spent in accordance with the intended purpose is at all times 
preferable in terms of efficiency. If the Georgian government was to improve the 
health care for IDPs, it is reasonable to argue that beneficiaries would spend more of 
the cash assistance on food rather than medicines and the impact on food security 
could thereby be further strengthened. 
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4.2.2 Calculation of Food Consumption Score 
 
With the aim of arriving at a reliable conclusion regarding the outcome of the project 
and its above-discussed positive impact on food security, we will calculate and 
evaluate the FCS of IDPs. Since the target group of the project was small and only 
covered IDPs, adjusting the thresholds for frequent consumption of sugar and oil, as 
discussed in section 2.2.2 is not justified. Nevertheless, studies have shown that 
frequent consumption of oil and sugar is a characteristic of the Georgian population, 
according to Nanitashvili. Hence raising the thresholds even though this project only 
targeted IDPs may be justified. Taking these two aspects into account, the analysis will 
be performed taking both the original and the adjusted threshold into consideration. 
 
Table 4.1: Food Consumption Score 
Food item Food group Weight Days (of 7) eaten Score 
Bread, cereals, potatoes, pasta Cereals and tubers 2 7 14 
Beans, peas, nuts Pulses 3 3 9 
Vegetables, herbs Vegetables 1 7 7 
Fruits, berries Fruits 1 2 2 
Meat, fish, eggs Meat 4 3 12 
Cheese, milk, yoghurt Dairy products 4 1 4 
Sugar and sweets Sugar 0.5 7 3.5 
Oil and fats Oils 0.5 7 3.5 
    Composite score 55 
 
The interviews that we conducted included the seven-day recall method, which records 
the number of days certain food items were consumed during the last seven days 
(Table A.2 in Annex A). By following the procedure of calculation laid out in section 
2.2.2, a FCS of 55 for the total number of households was obtained (Table 4.1). This 
score qualifies as acceptable food consumption, both when comparing with the 
original and adjusted WFP thresholds at 35 and 42 points respectively. It signifies a 
considerable improvement of the food security situation, as FCS was calculated to be 
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28 in September 2008 and only 15 percent of the households recorded an acceptable 
level of food consumption in February 2009. Although the WFP thresholds may 
indicate better food security than the factual situation, this should not be a cause of 
concern as the observed level of FCS is significantly higher than the pre-established 
thresholds of acceptable food consumption. Of the 55 points obtained in July, 30 stem 
from the food groups cereals and tubers, pulses, sugar and oils. These items are 
provided through WFP’s GFDs and bakery scheme and are thus contributing to the 
adequate calorie consumption. The remaining 25 points were accumulated by 
consumption of fresh foods, implying improved dietary diversity as the cash assistance 
enabled purchases of food items not included in the distributions of in-kind food 
assistance. 
 
Table 4.2: Consumption of Fresh Foods (% of Households) 
Number of days Meat Vegetables Fruits Dairy products 
0 23.1 0.0 15.4 69.3 
1 7.6 0.0 7.6 7.6 
2 15.4 0.0 77.0 0.0 
3 15.4 0.0 0.0 23.1 
4 23.1 15.4 0.0 0.0 
5 15.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7 0.0 84.6 0.0 0.0 
 
Although mainly due to the consumption of eggs, we found that the percentage of 
households consuming meat more than twice a week had increased to 54 percent 
(Table 4.2) compared with 0 percent in September and 5 percent in February. In 
addition, the intake of dairy products had increased by more than 12 percentage points 
compared to previous assessments. While all the interviewed households consumed 
vegetables more than twice a week compared to 6 and 26 percent in September and 
February respectively, the consumption of fruit was found to be lower in July than 
during previous assessments when fruit was consumed more than twice a week by 3 
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and 19 percent of the households. As the increased consumption of vegetables may be 
explained by the cash assistance being distributed during summer when prices of 
vegetables and fruit in general are lower, the observed decrease in the consumption of 
fruit suggests that these food items were still too expensive for IDPs or that they did 
not constitute priority purchases. It is important to acknowledge that the food group 
vegetables includes herbs. When applying the weight zero to herbs as a means of 
controlling for the inherent exclusion error of the measure, we found FCS to be 52 
(Table A.3 in Annex A). Although the score is lower, the level of food consumption is 
still considered acceptable compared with both the original and adjusted thresholds. 
The previous conclusion of the improved food security situation of IDPs is thereby 
strengthened. As the achieved FCS remains significantly higher than the original and 
adjusted thresholds of acceptable food consumption, the risk of WFP thresholds 
overestimating the food security situation is reconfirmed as not having a determining 
effect on the outcome of the project in terms of FCS. 
 
When summarising the above-mentioned aspects of expenditures and sources as well 
as FCS, the observed improvement in the food security situation of IDPs can be 
thought to originate from the increased access to food and enhanced food utilisation as 
the level of food availability on the Georgian market has been confirmed sufficient 
throughout the implementation process. A contributing factor to the increased access 
to food may have been the observed improvement in the cooking facilities of IDPs, 
resulting from the governmental provision of complimentary gas and electricity. 
However, there is one aspect to take into account when analysing the improved food 
security situation of IDPs. Since the households interviewed received a one-time 
transfer instead of a monthly disbursement, this may have influenced their spending 
pattern. As they had three times more cash available to devote to food purchases, the 
effect on food security may hence have been concentrated to one instead of distributed 
over three months. However, it cannot be said to have affected the general outcome of 
the project as it only concerned a minority of the total number of beneficiaries. It 
should furthermore be noted that the effects on food security to a certain degree 
depend on whether the beneficiaries have been targeted previously or not. This 
 42 
reasoning derives from Engel’s law of food consumption, suggesting that a marginal 
increase of income will have a larger effect on food security if provided to low-income 
households. Cash assistance targeted to households previously not receiving 
assistance, as in this case, will hence promote larger effects on food security. In 
conclusion, the IDPs have achieved acceptable food consumption through the 
provision of cash assistance, although their food security is still dependent on in-kind 
food assistance. 
 
 
4.3 Optimal Food Assistance Instrument 
 
With the aim of assessing whether cash assistance is the optimal food assistance 
instrument when addressing food security issues in Georgia, we will apply the key 
determinants of transfer choice to the prevailing country specific conditions. 
 
 
4.3.1 Cash Assistance versus In-kind Food Assistance Applied to the Georgian 
Context 
 
As the objective of the direct cash transfer project was to improve food security rather 
than purchasing power, it is of interest to compare the effects of cash in relation to in-
kind food assistance in order to determine the optimal food assistance instrument. 
 
Project Objectives  
As mentioned earlier, the direct cash transfer project can be said to have attained its 
objective since the proxy indicator of food security, FCS, had increased to a level 
where the consumption of all households was classified as acceptable. While 
effectiveness was reached through the achievement of the objective, efficiency was 
obtained as the benefits were outweighing the low costs related to the project. 
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Project Costs 
Earlier calculations made by WFP suggest that the costs of distributing food are 3.8 to 
13.1 times higher than transferring cash when associated with a bank fee of 1.8 percent 
(WFP, 2007, p. 13). As the bank fee for the direct cash transfer project was 1.5 
percent, the cost-comparison in favour of cash is still valid. Dolidze confirmed the low 
cost of the project, as the direct support costs4 and indirect support costs5 added up to 
11 percent of the total budget. He further stated that the project had been relatively 
cheap compared to an equivalent in-kind food assistance project since the direct 
support costs are the same irrespective of food assistance instrument, and the costs for 
transportation, storage and distribution were absent. Not only did the project show the 
possibility of rapid implementation of cash assistance, its total costs were not 
negatively influenced by the restricted preparations. The costs of the project were 
further limited as the expenses for issuing bankcards were included in the agreement 
already established between WFP and PBG. However, according to Epremidze, the 
low costs of the project did not induce more resources to be allocated to monitoring 
and accounting. Neither did its small scale affect monitoring, as the amount required 
was equal to that of any cash assistance project. 
 
Market Conditions 
In Georgia where markets are well integrated across the country and well functioning, 
and where the level of food availability is sufficient, cash is considered a better option 
than in-kind food assistance. This view is further strengthened as there was no risk of 
inflation according to WFP. However, the food access of IDPs is constrained by the 
higher retail prices for certain key commodities within Georgia than internationally 
(WFP, forthcoming, pp. 7-8), making it more valuable for beneficiaries to receive in-
kind food than cash assistance. Although the money received was spent locally, the 
secondary effects associated with cash assistance were assumed to be limited due to 
                                            
4 Direct support costs consist of bank fees and office expenses. 
5 Indirect support costs consist of headquarters cost which is dependent on the amount of cash 
assistance provided to beneficiaries. 
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the low number of beneficiaries, or absent considering the lack of arable land for the 
targeted IDPs. 
 
Administrative Capacity 
The combination of a well functioning banking system and decreasing corruption 
suggest limited risks of implementing cash assistance in Georgia and no need for 
additional costs related to security measures. This may be one explanation as to why 
project partners did not perceive corruption as a threat. Although it was observed that 
the outcome of the information distribution was inadequate, the efforts made may have 
reduced to some extent the risk of cash being diverted to corrupted authorities by 
increasing transparency. Not only does the adequate level of administrative capacity in 
Georgia favour cash assistance, possible inconveniences in terms of time and 
flexibility regarding the use of the banking system did not constitute a problem within 
the project, according to Dolidze. It is notable furthermore that the well functioning 
banking system and markets constituted one of the reasons as to why cash assistance 
was introduced by WFP in Georgia in 2005. These favourable conditions promoted the 
potential of cash as an alternative instrument of food assistance when addressing food 
security issues in the country. 
 
Social Protection 
The observed improvement of food security can partly be derived from existing 
governmental programmes such as IDP assistance, pensions and disbursements to 
households below the poverty line, as these in combination with the cash assistance 
improved the access to food of IDPs. Cash as the optimal food assistance instrument in 
the Georgian context is reconfirmed by the targeting strategy of the UN agencies, 
where they covered the gaps resulting from the government assistance to 
schoolchildren, indicating that the governmental programmes facilitated the 
adjustment of the project to the specific context. 
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Beneficiary Preferences 
Beneficiaries participating in the group discussions unanimously preferred cash to in-
kind food assistance. Although the demand for a combination of cash and in-kind food 
assistance was one of the motives behind the implementation of the first cash 
assistance project in Georgia, it was not considered in this case since the IDPs living in 
Tbilisi and Lagodekhi did not possess arable land. Nevertheless, considering their 
satisfactory access to markets with adequate food availability, their preference for cash 
was by no means surprising. The freedom to choose which items to purchase was the 
most frequently recurring argument among the IDPs, implying that cash maximises 
their utility. However, the lack of information among IDPs regarding the project can 
be related to consumer theory as they could not be expected to make rational decisions 
concerning utility maximisation without complete information. In-kind food assistance 
can therefore be said to constitute the optimal food assistance instrument. Despite the 
classification of Georgia as a country of low gender empowerment, gender-related 
preferences were not observed. Both men and women preferred cash, suggesting that 
the problem for women in keeping control of the money was not applicable to the 
Georgian context. The targeting of women may thus have influenced the positive 
outcome of the project on food security. The risk of not achieving nutritional 
objectives was furthermore limited as it was observed that the greatest share of the 
cash assistance was spent on food. 
 
When summarising and evaluating the number of above-mentioned aspects, it can be 
determined that the advantages of cash assistance are outweighing its inconveniences, 
which hence opts for cash assistance as the optimal food assistance instrument when 
addressing food security issues in Georgia. 
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4.3.2 Decision Trees Applied to the Georgian Context 
 
With the aim of reaching a reliable conclusion regarding the optimal food assistance 
instrument, we will apply the decision trees of transfer choice to the Georgian 
conditions.  
 
As the Georgian markets are well functioning, the answer to the first question in the 
Barrett-Maxwell decision tree is yes and cash assistance can therefore be said to 
constitute the optimal food assistance instrument. In addition, as WFP is focusing its 
activities on cash and in-kind food assistance, the alternative of providing jobs to 
beneficiaries could be achieved through cash for work projects. 
 
The cause of food insecurity and thus the point of departure in the Oxfam decision tree 
was demand failure. This in turn was a result of income loss, which is why the answer 
to the second question is yes. This is also the answer to the third question, as markets 
in Georgia are operating. Since Georgian markets are, as earlier concluded, well 
functioning one can assume that the government is not restricting food movement and 
the answer to the fourth question is hence no. The relatively high level of competition 
in and integration of food markets furthermore give affirmative answers to the fifth 
and sixth questions. As the risk of supply-failure is low, the answer to the seventh 
question is also yes. Finally, the answer to the last question is no since the risk of 
inflation induced by this project was limited. Cash assistance, with preferably women 
as the target group, is thus reconfirmed as the optimal food assistance instrument when 
addressing food security issues in Georgia. 
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5 Lessons for the Future 
 
 
 
 
 
With the aim of trying to assess how to improve future cash assistance, we conducted 
interviews with partners of the direct cash transfer project. The interviewed 
representatives of WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, MRA, CRA and PBG were engaged in 
the project on a technical rather than a policymaking level. 
 
 
5.1 Challenges and Lessons Learned 
 
According to the six project partners, the list of IDPs constituted the main challenge of 
the project, as CRA and MRA were lacking information about the great number of 
IDPs resettled after the conflict. According to the three UN agencies, the challenge of 
the list of IDPs was mainly due to the weak linkage between the two institutions. In 
order to improve their coordination skills, WFP gathered the partners in order to 
review the signed agreement and thereby clarify their respective responsibility. An 
additional challenge, emphasised by CRA, was the short timeframe of the registration 
process due to the emergency. The limited timeframe did not however pose any 
difficulties for PBG due to its widespread experience from large scale projects. 
 
Although the outcome of the project was successful according to all project partners, 
Sophie Jambazishivili-Yucer and Nino Kuchukidze at UNHCR argued that it was not a 
sustainable one as the target group was limited to IDPs. The lesson learned by 
UNHCR was therefore to continue with its regular activities, which aim at having 
greater impact on the community by targeting a larger group of the population and 
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thereby achieve higher sustainability. In addition, the lesson learned by UNICEF, 
according to Dimitri Gugushvili, was that cash is the most cost-efficient way of 
providing assistance during emergencies in countries where markets are functioning. 
Furthermore, Mikheil Teodoradze at MRA stated that they acquired knowledge on 
how to organise its work and how to take rapid decisions in emergency situations, 
while the lesson learned by CRA, as claimed by Zurab Magradze, was how to 
construct databases with higher capability of dealing with emergency situations. The 
temporary address of registered IDPs is one example of information previously 
unavailable but required for this project, and which therefore has been recently added 
to the database. This improvement of the database will be perceived as good news for 
WFP whose lesson learned from the project was that the database of CRA was not as 
well-developed as everyone had thought. 
 
Despite the coordination difficulties between MRA and CRA, the general opinion 
concerning the collaboration among the UN agencies and the Georgian government 
was highly affirmative. UNHCR especially appreciated the advantage of being able to 
segment the population according to the expertise of each organisation and hence 
address the specific needs of every age group. In addition, as the project had an 
innovative approach concerning the constellation of partners, UNICEF and MRA 
highly valued the experience acquired throughout the project. Interesting to note is that 
neither MRA nor CRA expressed any difficulties regarding the collaboration, between 
the two of them or with other project partners. 
 
Concerning the optimal food assistance instrument to implement in Georgia, UNICEF 
preferred cash as the Georgian market and financial system are working properly. In 
this context it was said to be important to distinguish between functional and 
dysfunctional families in order to avoid cash being transferred to families with social 
problems such as addiction and violence. However, as Georgia classifies as a middle-
income country the provision of cash was said to be the responsibility of the 
government and UNICEF is therefore focusing its activities on in-kind food assistance. 
The preference of WFP was in line with that of UNICEF with the addition that cash 
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for work was preferred to unconditional cash assistance. Assistance in terms of cash 
for work was said to be more sustainable since the beneficiaries have to perform some 
type of work, either on their own plot or within the community. As UNICEF, UNHCR 
is mainly providing in-kind assistance. The reasoning behind this choice was the 
opposite though. Despite its limited experience of providing in-kind food assistance, 
UNHCR was of the opinion that it is at all times better to give in-kind food than cash 
since it is easier to ensure that the purpose of a project will be fulfilled. Although 
having varying views regarding the optimal food assistance instrument, all partners 
concluded that one should always consider the specific context of implementation, 
such as weather and living conditions, before deciding on which instrument to provide. 
The choice of implementing cash assistance in the aftermath of the conflict in August 
2008 was furthermore agreed to have been the optimal choice considering the 
prevailing emergency. 
 
 
5.2 Improving Cash Assistance 
 
In order to ensure the complete picture of how to improve cash assistance, we will 
evaluate the interviews with project partners as well as the key determinants of transfer 
choice applied to the Georgian context. 
 
Although the challenge of the short time frame is something that cannot be avoided in 
a future emergency situation, the handling of the list of IDPs can be improved. In 
addition to the recently extended database of CRA, MRA is developing its own 
database to be able to manage the task of registration by itself in the future. In order to 
avoid duplication the database is constructed in cooperation with CRA. Although the 
development of the database is progressing slowly according to Dolidze, its 
finalisation will improve future cash assistance as it will include all information 
required when implementing projects at the same time as the coordination problems 
between MRA and CRA will be avoided. 
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Future projects will moreover benefit from the acquired knowledge of project partners 
concerning how to provide cash assistance in different kinds of situations, especially 
emergencies. The clarification of the responsibility of each partner will constitute an 
additional advantage to future improvements. Higher efficiency will also be achieved 
since WFP has recognised the need of greater technological capacity and human 
capital among partners as well as more training and monitoring in order to improve the 
construction of the list of IDPs as well as the provision of information to beneficiaries. 
Calls to the MRA hotline should furthermore be made free of charge to make certain 
that the IDPs acquire the information needed. 
 
As the collaboration was highly appreciated and the desire for it to continue was 
expressed, the direct cash transfer project may constitute the beginning of long-term 
cooperation. Based on the argumentation of UNHCR regarding the collaboration, this 
partnership may have a positive impact on future cash assistance through higher 
sustainability, as the needs of persons of all ages can be addressed by the comparative 
advantage of each organisation. Sustained cooperation would also limit unnecessary 
administrative and bureaucratic costs associated with the opening of bank accounts. 
 
Although the Georgian social protection framework benefited the adjustment of the 
project to the specific context, a reinforcement of the health care system is an 
additional factor that would improve cash assistance. Furthermore, Engel’s law of food 
consumption implies that cash assistance targeted to beneficiaries previously not 
receiving assistance will promote more efficient outcomes of future projects. 
 
Although the three UN agencies had differing opinions regarding the preferred 
instrument of food assistance, they all concurred that the specific context needs to be 
assessed in order for them to make the transfer choice. It can thus be concluded that 
high efficiency of future cash assistance can only be achieved when the choice of the 
type of cash assistance is based on the specific context in which the project will be 
implemented. 
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6 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
 
 
The conflict with Russia in August 2008 threatened to aggravate the food security 
situation in Georgia. A direct cash transfer project was therefore implemented as an 
emergency response in order to meet basic household requirements of IDPs. As the 
leading agency, WFP joined forces with UNHCR and UNICEF to cover the specific 
requirements of all age groups through the provision of cash. CRA and MRA were 
also involved with the purpose of registering and keeping track of the IDPs in order to 
enable the construction of the list of IDPs. To be able to transfer the cash assistance to 
beneficiaries, PBG was chosen as the banking partner and WFP distributed monthly 
payments of GEL 25 between February and April 2009. The amount provided was 
intended to cover a calculated calorie gap of 300 kcal through purchases of fresh 
foods, complementing the GFDs of dry staple foods and thereby improving food 
security. By targeting a woman of each household and by distributing information 
concerning the project, the effects on food security were intended to be strengthened. 
The complexity and sensitivity of cash assistance required continuous monitoring and 
establishment of various mechanisms aiming at facilitating the updating of the list of 
IDPs, in order to ensure the effects of the project on food security. 
 
When examining the impact of the direct cash transfer on food security, it was found 
that it had ameliorated as a result of better food access and food utilisation. This 
conclusion was reconfirmed by the observed increase in the proxy indicator of food 
security, FCS, signifying improved dietary diversity and food frequency. The targeting 
of women as well as the governmental provision of housing, gas, electricity and free 
transportation for IDPs may also have played a role in the improvement of food 
security as they had the effect of ensuring that the cash was used for its intended 
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purpose. Nevertheless, the expenditures on non-food items indicate that the IDPs had 
other more pressing needs or simply that the implementation of cash assistance was 
unjustified. An additional explanation may be the accumulated transaction, leaving 
IDPs with additional resources when their food needs were satisfied. As the cash 
amount was not spent entirely in accordance with its purpose, this imposed a 
restriction on the access to food of IDPs and hence on their food security. This effect 
may have been further exacerbated by the observed increase in the share of households 
having no other income source than the cash assistance. It was however found that the 
greatest share of the cash assistance was spent on food, thus limiting the risk of cash 
being used for non-intended purposes. An additional factor assumed to have 
contributed to the positive effect on food security was the target group, as it did not 
receive food assistance prior to the conflict. Although one can conclude that the food 
security of IDPs has improved following the project, it is important to note that they 
remain dependent on external assistance as their sources of food expenditures almost 
entirely originated from the received cash and in-kind food assistance provided by 
WFP. It should nonetheless be noted that the sample size of this study is rather limited 
and the ability to draw statistically valid conclusions from the information collected is 
therefore restricted. Important to consider is also that the use of interviews poses 
limitations as the conclusions are based on the reliability of the information provided 
by the translator. The risk of beneficiaries conveying incorrect information due to their 
desire of receiving additional assistance should furthermore not be neglected. 
 
Cash assistance was concluded to constitute the optimal food assistance instrument 
when addressing food security issues in Georgia. This was based on various key 
determinants of transfer choice in which the well functioning markets, the adequate 
level of administrative capacity and the limited costs related to the project played a 
determining role. Although the same conclusion was reached when considering the 
preference of beneficiaries, the opinion of project partners was varying. While they 
agreed that different contexts imply various needs, cash assistance was said to have 
been the optimal choice of food assistance instrument considering the conditions 
prevailing in Georgia in the aftermath of the conflict. Worth emphasising is that this 
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result is based on interviews with project partners who cannot be considered neutral in 
the context of the project. The view of cash as the optimal food assistance instrument 
is challenged by prices being higher in Georgia than internationally, and by IDPs not 
being expected to make rational decisions concerning their utility as they lacked 
information concerning the project. 
 
In the assessment of how cash assistance can be improved, a prerequisite is to consider 
the specific context as well as the target group. While the prevailing conditions should 
determine the choice between conditional or unconditional cash assistance, future 
efficiency also hinges on whether or not beneficiaries have been previously targeted. 
Future projects are moreover assumed to benefit from greater knowledge of partners 
concerning how to provide cash assistance in different kinds of situations, as well as 
from the clarification of their respective responsibilities. Additional improvements can 
be achieved as MRA will be the sole government agency registering and keeping track 
of IDPs, and problems related to its weak linkage with CRA will thus be avoided. 
What will further contribute to future improvements is the development of the MRA 
database, anticipated to limit the encountered problems related to the list of IDPs. 
Meeting the acknowledged requirements of increased technological capacity, human 
capital, training and monitoring in order to ensure adequate information collection and 
dissemination, should furthermore result in more efficient cash assistance. While the 
desire of partners to continue collaborating will limit unnecessary administrative and 
bureaucratic costs, it will also contribute to improvements as their respective expertise 
will generate greater sustainability. Furthermore considering the noticeable need of a 
better health care system for IDPs, improved cash assistance could be achieved if 
future projects are to be implemented in combination with a strengthened social 
protection framework. 
 
Although progress has been made regarding food security in Georgia, there are still 
improvements to be made in order to benefit entirely from the potential of cash as the 
optimal food assistance instrument. Additional case studies are therefore desired, 
especially as this study has emphasised the importance of the specific context. 
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Table A.2: Seven-day Recall Method 
Food item Days (of seven) consumed 
Wheat bread 7 
Other types of cereals 1 
Potatoes 3 
Pasta 4 
Beans 3 
Peas 0 
Nuts 0 
Vegetables 4 
Herbs 7 
Fruits and berries 2 
Meat 1 
Fish 0 
Eggs 2 
Dairy products 1 
Sugar or sweets 7 
Oils and fats 7 
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Table A.3: Food Consumption Score when Controlling for Herbs 
Food item Food group Weight Days (of 7) eaten Score 
Bread, cereals, potatoes, pasta Cereals and tubers 2 7 14 
Beans, peas, nuts Pulses 3 3 9 
Vegetables Vegetables 1 7 4 
Fruits, berries Fruits 1 2 2 
Meat, fish, eggs Meat 4 3 12 
Cheese, milk, yoghurt Dairy products 4 1 4 
Sugar and sweets Sugar 0.5 7 3.5 
Oil and fats Oils 0.5 7 3.5 
Herbs Vegetables 0 7 0 
    Composite score 52 
 
 
 
